MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT OR FOR RECONSIDERATION 

This case presents a stark and simple legal question: may the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission acting deliberately, illegally, and as a matter of policy deprive its citizens of an established and significant property right without also violating the United States Constitution.  Plaintiffs say 'no.'  This Court has said 'yes.'   Plaintiffs believe the Court is clearly wrong.  We ask that it enter a final judgment on the primary claim at issue in this action so plaintiffs can seek an immediate appeal. In the alternative, we ask that this Court reconsider its prior ruling and grant summary judgment to plaintiffs.

This motion is pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule permits this Court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties."  In its Memorandum and Order dated April 26, 2002, this Court granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs' primary claim: that the revocation of their taxi drivers' license was illegal and deprived them of their property rights secured by the Constitution.  This first-offense revocation was caused hundreds of taxi drivers to be thrown out of work causing millions of dollars in damages to the putative class.  At the same time, this Court has granted summary judgment of plaintiffs secondary claim that the Taxi & Limousines revocation procedures were unconstitutional, and it has ordered discovery as to the possible bias of TLC administrative judges. In so ruling, the Court has said that it is fine for the TLC to deliver a lawless blow so long as it provides a semblance of process first.

Plaintiffs believe the TLJ judges are systemically biased and would welcome the opportunity—which has been denied—to take discovery on this issue and other issues.  Still, this court's ruling leaves plaintiffs and the putative class encompassing hundreds of drivers who have lost their livelihoods in an untenable position. They are asked to pursue expensive and time-consuming discovery—which the TLC will certainly fight tooth and nail—on a nub of a lawsuit.  The parties will have to try one case on the bias of the TLC tribunal. If plaintiffs successfully appeal the license revocation claim, the parties would have to convene for a second trial involving many of the same witnesses, much of the same evidence and some of the same damages. We submit that it would be more efficient to allow an appeal to the Second Circuit of the primary claim, which can be resolved as a matter of law. If that appeal is granted, the case can be pursued as a whole. 

This Court's Ruling Was Inconsistent with its
Prior Rulings and Mischaracterized Plaintiffs' Claim

In its memorandum and order dated August 28, 2000, concerning plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, this Court stated: "There is little doubt that Padberg has met the first requirement of a § 1983 claim, for if the TLC had revoked his license without the requisite authority, then it would indeed have deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution." August 28, 2000 Memorandum and Order p. 14.  This Court went on to decide that the TLC did have authority, based on an analysis of TLC regulations, but saying nothing about the relevant city statutes or the City Charter.[1] We submit this was the correct analysis. We also submit that a proper focus on the statutes and the City Charter as well as the regulations, ends all doubt: the TLC has no authority to revoke a taxi drivers' license for a first (or second) refusal offense, no matter what procedures it affords before doing so.

But in deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court completely changed its analysis.  It did so without even acknowledging what it had written before. It reached out for a theory of the case defendants did not advance and based its ruling on cases defendants did not cite.  It also decided a claim plaintiffs did not make.  In doing so, the Court explicitly refuses to decide the legal issue that all parties agreed was at the heart of this case—the scope of the TLC's authority.  And it ruled without any notice or indication of what it was about to do, never allowing the parties to brief the issue.

In its April 26, 2002 ruling, this Court characterizes plaintiffs' primary claim—that the TLC lacks legal authority to revoke plaintiffs' licenses—as "substantive due process."  This was wrong, indeed violently wrong. Plaintiffs never made any claim of "substantive due process."  The term does not appear in plaintiffs' complaint. It does not appear in any of plaintiffs' briefs.  Defendants, similarly, do not use the term.  

Only the Court uses the term, as a prelude to calling plaintiffs' claim dangerous and obscure because so-called substantive due process claims might thrust the court into "' [an] unchartered area [that is] scarce and open-ended.'" Memorandum and Order p.32 (quoting cases).  This Court, of course, is free to characterize claims.  But to decide these motions based on a mislabeling is clear error.

This case is not about some obscure right or a dangerous expansion of an existing right. It is about hack licenses, which were specifically recognized as a form of property by the New York Court of Appeals nearly half a century ago. Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461 (1954); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).  The TLC and the City do not dispute that a taxi driver has a property right in his hack license. This Court acknowledges it as well. That is why this case turns not on the existence of a right, but on whether that right—a right essential to a cabbie's livelihood-- was taken without due process of law. 

As discussed more fully below, the "substantive due process" cases this Court cites all concern situations where the plaintiff had no defined right.  Here the right is undisputed.  The only question is whether the TLC had authority—lawfully delegated, fairly enacted, and properly motivated-- to destroy that right.  This is the question this Court refuses to decide, but which must be decided.

This Action, Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Turns on the Proper Following of Procedures, Not on the Creation of New Rights

This case cannot be resolved, we submit, by creating an artificial procedural/substantive divide. But if there is such a divide, plaintiffs' illegal revocation claims are actually procedural and do not deserve to be set aside as "substantive due process."  In fact, in revoking plaintiffs' licenses, the mayor, the TLC and TLC officials violated four separate procedural requirements.

First, as we have argued, the City Charter (§ 2300) empowers the Taxi and Limousine Commission to make rules concerning taxi drivers, taking that power out of the hands of the Mayor. Here, there is strong evidence that the Mayor ordered the TLC to enact Operation Refusal.  The Court cites that evidence (Memorandum and Order pp. 8-9), but never addresses the consequence: Mayor Giuliani violated the rules—the procedural rules-- imposed by the city's organic law.

Second, we argued that the City Charter requires the full commission vote on new rules pertaining to the revocation of licenses. See City Charter § 2301(e) (“The commission shall have power to act by a majority of its members.")  This rule is procedural rule, too.  The Court cites the rule, and then says it need not decide whether it was violated—because the TLC's interpretation, even if "patently erroneous" was not patently erroneous enough to be a "gross abuse" as to violate substantive due process.  (See Memorandum and Order pp. 34-35)  But the requirement that an agency vote is a procedural requirement. It is also a basic requirement of our democratic system.  Indeed, it is undisputed that when the other commissioners were consulted after the fact, they denounced the dictate of the Chairwoman and the Mayor — an important fact this Court ignores. (See Ackman Supp. Decl. Exh. 1)  Failure to vote when a vote is required: what can be more fundamental than that?

Third, we argued the TLC violated the limits of its own authority as defined by statute, specifically Administrative Code, § 19-507-- entitled Mandatory Penalties—which establishes the law against service refusals and the penalties.  The basic principle that an agency cannot exceed its lawful authority—as defined by both federal and state law—is a procedural principle.  Moreover there is no exception for instances where the agency is "at least arguably" acting within it authority. (See Memorandum and Order p. 37)  Plaintiffs claim is not that Chairwoman's action was, in the Court's words, incorrect or ill-advised.  The claim is that the action was illegal.  Either it has authority (including authority within its discretion) or it does not. This court must decide—or it must allow the Second Circuit to decide.

Fourth, we argue that even if the Chairwoman had power to rule on her own, which she does not, she has no power rule in contradiction to a validly enacted City statute. The basic set-up of American government-- whether at the federal level, the state level, or the city level—is that administrative agencies can make rules, but only within statutory parameters. (See Memorandum and Order p. 35) This is a procedural rule writ large. It may not have to do with the set up of an individual tribunal or hearing. It is more fundamental, more basic. Still, it is procedural.

Not providing the city's cab drivers a pre-suspension hearing was wrong and unconstitutional. Stacking the deck in the hearings by telling the judges how to decide—that was bad, too.  But running roughshod over the fundamental requirements of our democratic and constitutional system was an exercise of raw power and it was ten times worse.  The TLC, its Chairwoman and the Mayor failed to adhere to basic procedures.  In so doing they acted under color of law— yet acted lawlessly-- and deprived plaintiffs of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.  Plaintiffs submit Section 1983 provides a remedy, and would like to address this claim to the Second Circuit.

The Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendants Is
Based on Factual Conclusions that are Both Improper and Incorrect

"[T]here is nothing to suggest that Chairperson McGrath-McKechnie or Mayor Giuliani were prompted to act by anything other than legitimate motives," this Court concludes. (Memorandum and Order p. 34)   It goes on to say, "Defendants were acting pursuant to authority that they believed they possessed." (Id. at 38)   These are factual conclusions.  In fact, there is nothing on the record indicating what the Mayor's motives were or why Ms. McGrath-McKechnie acted.  Even if they actually believed they had authority, a wave of OATH court decisions quickly informed them they were wrong. ( See Memorandum and Order p. 37 and cases cited)    At that point, all pretenses to good faith went out the window.  This is why Ms. McGrath-McKechnie wrote to the chief OATH judge in a vain effort to get the OATH judges to change their rulings. (See Ackman Decl. Exhs. 7-8).

After the OATH judges ruled, the TLC did not alter its conduct at all. By the same token, the TLC continued to suspend drivers without a hearing after the August 28, 2000 decision and even after this Court granted a TRO in Smith v. McGrath-McKechnie et al, Ind. No. 01 Civ 1786 (RJD), a related case.  Instead, the TLC simply reassigned the refusal cases to its own judges. (See Memorandum and Order p. 43 n.10)

To grant defendants' summary judgment on this ground is totally improper, especially when, as this Court knows, plaintiffs were never permitted to depose the former chairwoman, so say nothing of the former mayor.  Plaintiffs repeated requests to take such discovery were consistently opposed by defendants.  Defendants refused even to turn over relevant documents on what plaintiffs submit were bogus privilege claims.  The magistrate in this action repeatedly ruled in their favor, or simply failed to rule either way.  Either way, plaintiffs were denied discovery.  Yet now the court rules on just the sort of factual claim plaintiffs were seeking to rebut.

The court credits defendants lawyers' assertions that their motives were legitimate. At the same time it dismisses plaintiffs' claim that the Mayor was acting out of political ambition just before launching a campaign for the U.S. Senate as a "bare allegation."  Of course, it is no barer than defendants' implicit denials. The court adds: "The fact that a public official may derive political benefit from his or her pursuit of an otherwise legitimate government objective does not make that objective any less legitimate."  Plaintiffs do not take issue with this claim.  But if political gain was, in fact, the Mayor's motive, and the limited record evidence certainly suggests it was, defendants should certainly not be credited for their professed desire to combat alleged racial discrimination among taxicab drivers.

Indeed, what evidence that was before this Court indicates that the problem—which we do not dispute exists on some level-- is overblown.  Plaintiffs presented undisputed proof that—based on the TLC and the NYPD's own survey conducted at the start of Operation Refusal-- 99 percent of taxi drivers accepted the hail of undercover minority police officers.  (See Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum of Law p. 5 and n. 4 and Ackman Suppl. Decl. Exh. 6)  That same survey shows that TLC inspectors were far more likely to conclude that an alleged service refusal was "race-based."  It is also undisputed that the TLC was suspending (and later revoking) drivers for service refusals that had nothing to do with race—but rather with safety or economic concerns.  The timing of the mayor's actions certainly suggests politics was the prime mover here.  Circumstances suggest the mayor was acting to gain support among black voters, and without regard for the rights of foreign born, politically voiceless cabbies.  Plaintiffs concede that without discovery they have not proved this claim. But defendants have not proved the contrary.

In the absence of proof, court ruled defendants believed they had authority.  We submit the more likely scenario is that they knew they did not have authority, concocted a pretext for that authority, and then prayed they would never be challenged. Certainly there are questions.   At best, the Court's assertions as to motive are unsupported.  None of this is to suggest that the TLC cannot regulate against refusals of all kind, or that it must act wisely or without one eye on the Mayor's next campaign—that would be too much.  But it must act lawfully.  To credit proper motives as part of this calculus is improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, which permits summary judgment to be granted only if there is "no genuine issue of material fact."[2]

Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claim Depends on the Existence of An
Established Right; Accordingly, the Cases this Court Cites Are Beside The Point 

As we have argued, plaintiffs property right claim cannot be characterized as a "substantive due process" claim.  Reviewing the cases the court cites, one sees how far afield this action is from the substantive due process claims those decisions reject.  In fact, even those decisions support plaintiffs' property right claim.  This is not surprising since plaintiffs' claim is squarely within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the statute has been construed by the Supreme Court since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).    

This Court relies on the Supreme Court's decision Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), and its warning against "expand[ing] the concept of substantive due process," Id. at 125.  But in quoting Justice Stevens' opinion, this Court truncates the warning, which begins "As a general matter."   The words omitted are critical since the Supreme Court did not decide the case based on this warning, this general matter.  It decided the case—as the other cases this Court cites are decided—based on its analysis of whether the plaintiff has asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement.  In Collins, for instance, the Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Constitution does not protect an asserted right to a safe workplace.  Thus it rejected the claim of the petitioner whose husband, a city employee, had died in a workplace accident.   

Indeed, all the so-called substantive due process cases this Court cites turn on the same question: whether the person asserting the right had a clear entitlement. This Court cites a number of cases, but relies principally on two, Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1999), and Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989).  These cases both are resolved not on the label substantive due process, but on the nature of the interest in the claim asserted.  

In Natale, the Second Circuit overturned a jury verdict awarding damages to a landowner who had been refused certain zoning and building permits.  The court held as it did because the permit applicants lacked a "clear entitlement to the permit under state law." 170 F. 3d at 163.  Although the Connecticut state courts ultimately determined that the applicants should have been granted the permits and ordered they be granted, there was a legitimate dispute involving complex zoning regulations and a factual dispute about whether building lots had been grandfathered decades earlier.  The Second Circuit emphasized this "[u]ncertainty as to the meaning of the applicable law."

Natale relies on several cases which make the true basis for its ruling even more apparent. Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995), also involved a permit, in this case an excavation permit, that the defendant town had refused.  In Walz, the court affirmed a jury verdict because the right to the permit was clear, and noted that it had been denied to pressure the applicants to convey some of their land to the town.  "[T]he framework for evaluating the claim is the well-developed property interest analysis, which has its origins in the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)," the court wrote. Walz, 46 F.3d at 167  "The focus of this analysis is on the nature of the applicant's interest in the approval being sought, specifically whether the applicant has a clear entitlement to the approval…." Id. at 168 (emphasis added).

The other cases this Court cites are in line with Walz and Natale. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), the plaintiff, who was killed while leading the police on a high-speed car chase, had no legitimate expectation that he would not be chased. In Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1994), the prisoner plaintiff had no expectation that he would not be put in solitary confinement for refusing to obey a guard's order. In Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F. 3d 202 (2d Cir. 1995), a city employee had no right not to have his duties reduced so long as he was paid his salary—and in fact he got a raise.  The question in all these cases is did the plaintiff enunciate a clear right or entitlement. The question of whether the complained of action was "arbitrary" or "outrageous" or "shocked the conscience" was secondary to the main question: did the plaintiff assert an established right.  If the plaintiff had no right, he had no remedy under Section 1983.  In this case, by contrast, everyone concedes that a taxi driver's property right in his license is firmly established and is protected by the Constitution.

Finally, this court discusses Rosa R. at some length. In that case, a student was suspended and then expelled from school after bringing a loaded gun to the school for the purposes of selling it.  (This court's opinion omits the part about the gun, which is interesting because bringing a loaded gun to school—unlike a service refusal—is certainly a felony.  Comparing the city's taxi drivers to a common criminal is worse than inapposite; it is a rank insult.) An expulsion hearing was delayed at the request of the student and his mother.  After the hearing, the student was expelled from school for 180 days.  Because the school board failed to give the student credit for "time served," his mother sued.

The Second Circuit rejected the claim, and did reason that the decision not to credit time served was not arbitrary or irrational.  But the reason it was not arbitrary or irrational was not because it is rational to punish school gun-sellers.  It was not arbitrary because there was no claim that Connecticut law established any right to credit for time served on a school expulsion.  The court also suggested the student had waived his argument. Thus, the court would not second-guess the school board. 889 F. 2d at 439.

Comparing Rosa R. to the instant case is indeed telling.  In Rosa R. the student committed a felony and lost a year in school.  In this case, plaintiffs violated a TLC regulation, and lost their right to earn a living as a taxi driver forever!  A more apt comparison to this case might be if a school had a specific rule that swearing at a teacher would result in a 10-day suspension. If then a superintendent decided that swearing was out of control, and decided on his own that any student swearing at a teacher must be expelled for a year.  If that superintendent properly changed the rule—say, through a vote by the school board-- he could probably constitutionally enforce the harsher punishment.  But if that superintendent acted on his own, or on orders from the mayor, and never held the required vote, certainly his personal decision to expel a student for a year despite the existing 10-day rule would be illegal and unconstitutional.  That the superintendent claimed to believe with all his heart that he had the authority would not change the result.

Defendant McGrath-McKechnie was much like this superintendent.  She acted in violation of what plaintiffs submit was a clear statutory rule.  She acted by fiat when a vote was required.  Her supposed wish to defeat racism is irrelevant. Her purported belief in her own power is likewise irrelevant.  

Leading Supreme Court Cases Demonstrate that Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim is Classically Within the Scope of the Statute

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. The Supreme Court revived this statute in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court ruled that cities and city agencies as well as natural persons could be liable under this law. These two leading cases taken together demonstrate that plaintiffs have established a classic Section 1983 violation. 

In Monroe v. Pape, the complaint alleged police officers broke into petitioners' home, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room, ransacked every room, and then held Mr. Monroe at a police station and detained on "open" charges for 10 hours, not permitting him to call his family or attorney. He was later released without charges. The Supreme Court held the police had acted "under color of" law and that petitioners could sue the officers under the Reconstruction era law now known familiarly as Section 1983.

In a famous dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that the police should not be said to have acted "under color of" law, because they were not acting pursuant to official policy. Indeed, the officer's action was illegal under state law.  He argued that Section 1983 should apply only when the wrongs of state officers were commanded by their government or were caused by custom or usage. Justice Frankfurter based his argument on his reading of the legislative history and his concerns about federalism.

Justice Frankfurter, of course, lost that argument.  Since then, the allegation that a police officer has beaten an innocent man has become perhaps the prototypical Section 1983 claim.  What is relevant here is that even the dissenting Justice in Monroe v. Pape would have seen plaintiffs' claim—that the TLC's official policy robbed them of their right—as squarely covered by the statute.  

The Supreme Court revisited the scope of Section 1983 in Monell.  In that case, female employees of the New York City Department of Social Services and the Board of Education complained that as a matter of official policy they were compelled to take unpaid leaves of absence when they were pregnant even if there was no medical reason to quit work.  They sued for an injunction and for backpay.  The specific issue was whether local governments (and local officials acting in their official capacities) could be sued directly under Section 1983. The Supreme Court held local governments could be sued directly, overruling in part Monroe v. Pape.   The Court held further that a local government could be held liable when its law, custom or policy was the "moving force" behind the unconstitutional action and not for the rogue actions of its agents.

In finding that the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education could be liable, the Court did not require that their acts be "outrageous" or that it "shock the conscience."  The Supreme Court upheld the claim without any discussion as to whether the city officials believed their policy was legal.  Petitioners had a right of "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life" based on an earlier Supreme Court case, Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).  Since this right was established, they could sue under Section 1983. 

Such is the case here. The city's taxi drivers have an established right to their licenses.  They have been deprived of that right by the official policy of a city agency.  If that policy was illegal or unlawfully promulgated, the agency and its officials must be held liable.

This Court Should Have Allowed the
Parties to Brief the Substantive Due Process Issue

This Court clearly has the right to decide any motion on any lawful grounds.  But plaintiffs object to the Court's procedure of departing from its prior analysis and granting summary judgment to defendants on a theory—substantive due process-- defendants never advanced and which plaintiffs never addressed.  As noted, plaintiffs never made any claim of substantive due process.  Defendants never characterized plaintiffs' claim this way.  As a result the Court's decision came as a complete surprise.

We submit that a better practice would have been to ask the parties to brief the substantive due process notion.  This was the practice followed by OATH Judge Spooner   in Taxi and Limousine Comm'n v. Ouali, OATH Index No. 1855/00 (Feb. 16, 2001), a case this Court cites. In Ouali, Judge Spooner issued a report and recommendation on May 3, 2000, "in which he sustained the violations for refusal and recommended a fine of $350, the maximum fine for a first-time refusal under section 19-507 of the Administrative Code." Several months later, Chairwoman McGrath-McKechnie remanded the case for reconsideration of the penalty recommendation in light of this Court's August 28, 2000 decision.  Judge Spooner asked for briefs "upon the issue of whether [the decision] "offers any interpretation concerning the legal effect of section 19-507 (b) (1)."  Though only the TLC supplied a brief, Judge Spooner reaffirmed his earlier recommendation because, in his view, the August 28, 2000 Decision spoke only to the TLC regulations, not the statute. 

In the interim the parties in this action were able to address the statute, the requirement that the full Commission vote on revocation policies and other issues. They should have been allowed to address substantive due process, too.  That they were not is reason enough for this Court to reconsider granting defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs most important claim. 

This Court Should Enter a Final Judgment Allowing For Immediate Appeal as to Plaintiffs' Illegal Revocation Claim

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action … or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."  Plaintiffs submit entry of a final judgment is appropriate here.

The Court has permitted plaintiffs to pursue a claim that the TLC judges are biased and to seek discovery. The bias claim—and indeed TLC's failure to offer pre-suspension hearings—cannot be neatly separated from the overriding claim that the penalties imposed through Operation Refusal were illegal even after a hearing. All of Operation Refusal works together.

This court has decided that a cabbie has a right to a hearing before his license is suspended.  If that hearing is before a biased tribunal, the hearing is of little use.  But even a fair hearing would be infected by the prospect of an illegal punishment.  For example, if a cabbie is faced with a credible threat that his license will be revoked, he will be far more likely to accept a plea bargain involving a fine or even a suspension.  If he believes the TLC ALJ will be biased against him, he will also be less inclined to risk defending himself.  The overriding point is that all aspects of the system—a hearing, an unbiased tribunal, and a punishment, if any, authorized by law—work together.  As plaintiffs submit that the threat of an illegal punishment is the key reason (not the only reason) Operation Refusal is unconstitutional, the court should certify an immediate appeal of that claim.[3]  In the alternative, it should reconsider and grant summary judgment to plaintiffs. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should enter a final judgment as to all claims except claims related to possible bias of the TLC tribunal or, in the alternative, reconsider its prior order and grant summary judgment to plaintiffs as to the illegal revocation claim, and grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

Dated: New York, New York
            May 7, 2002

 _________________________

Daniel L. Ackman (DA-0103)
201 West 89th St., 15th flr.
New York, New York 10024
(212) 496-2263

Attorney for Plaintiffs 

TO: 

Jerald Horowitz, Esq.
NYC Corp. Counsel
100 Church Street
New York, NY  10007 

Counsel For Defendants 

Chaumtoli Huq, Esq.
Ken Kimerling, Esq.
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
99 Hudson Street, 12th Flr.
New York, NY 10013 

 Attorneys for Baig Plaintiffs